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Abstract
The paper studies the relationship between public sector financial
deficits, crowding-out of public sector capital formation and inflation in
a number of small, classical macroeconomic models. This amounts to
reworking some of the government budget constraint literature by including
capacity constraints, flexible prices and rational expectations. After
considering some simple "money only' and "money—capital" models, most of
the paper is devoted to the analysis of a continuous time representation of
the "money—bonds-.capitaP model of Sargent and Wallace. It is noted that
the conventionally measured deficit is likely to be a poor indicator both
of the "eventual monetization" implied by the fiscal stance and of the long—
run financial crowding-Out pressure it represents. A better measure would
be the inflation-and-real-growth-corrected, cyclically adjusted ("permanent")
government currect account deficit as a proportion of national income.
It is also suggested that the Sargent—Wallace "paradox" -inthe
variable velocity model ,lowermonetary growth now may mean higher inflation
•now and in the future —hasits counterpart in the possibility that lower
money growth now may give lower inflation now and in the future. In the
constant velocity model the Sargent-Wallace findings are confirmed when
the real interest rate is made endogenous.
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Iwould like to thank Charles Bean for lending a helping hand with a
recalcitrant differential equation.1. INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the relationship between monetary growth,
government deficits and crowding out. Public sector deficits, if not quite
the root of all evil, are nevertheless frowned upon, condemned and combated
by finance ministers, central bankers and heads of international financial
institutions. The case against government deficits can be briefly stated as
follows:
Deficits must be financed by borrowing or "high-powered" domestic credit
expansion. In a closed economy or an open economy with a freely floating
exchange rate, "high-powered" domestic credit expansion equals the rate of
change of the monetary base.If deficits are financed by printing money,
this will fuel inflation. If they are financed by borrowing this will put
upward pressure on interest rates, leading to "crowding out" of interest-
sensitive spending. Even at given interest rates "crowding out" could cccur,
with government bonds displacing claims to private capital in private
portfol ios.
Like most conventional wisdom in economics, the account of the money
growth -deficit-crowdingout nexus just given is a (potentially
dangerous) half—truth. The correct relationships are fortunately quite
easily derived. They involve no more than a "dusting off" of the government
budget constraint literature with allowance for real growth, inflation,
public sector capital formation, and cyclical deviations of actual from
trend output (Blinder and Solow (1973), Buiter (l977a, b), (1979), Tobin
and Buiter (1976, 1980).)
The paper analyses the implications of government deficits in a number-2—
of familiar macroeconomic models. Three limitations, to be remedied in
future research, stand out. First, only closed economies are modelled.
Second, "money" is identified throughout with the monetary base. Private
money is not considered. Third, only full employment models are considered.
Even with these restrictions, a number of important issues can be dealt with.
The plan of the paper is as followsY7 Section 2 considers models without
public sector interest-bearing debt. After analysing a model in which money
is the only asset, two models with money and real capital are studied.
Section 3 considers models with money, real capital and public sector
interest-bearing debt. This whole section is organised around the seminal
paper of Sargent and Wallace (1981) in which rational expectations met the
government budget constraint. It is noted in Section (3a) that it is
necessary to correct the conventionally measured deficit for changes in the
real value of government interest-bearing debt due to inflation to obtain a
proper measure both of the "crowding out pressure" and of the eventual
monetisation implied by the fiscal stance. In Section (3b) the Sargent-
Wallace "paradox" that lower monetary growth now may mean higher future
inflation and even, with velocity endogenous, higher inflation now is
analysed. It is argued that a counter-paradox" -lowermonetary growth now
leading to lower inflation now and in the future -canalso occur when
velocity is endogenous. A diagrammatic description of this phenomenon is
provided. In Section (3c) it is shown that the exogenous real interest rate
of the Sargent-Wallace model can be endogenised without changing its
qualitative conclusions in the case when velocity is constant. Public sector
capital formation is introduced in Section (3d). It is argued that (with
proper allowance for any difference between the appropriated rate of return
on public sector capital and the government's cost of borrowing) it is the
government's current account deficit that matters for future inflation andfor crowding out of total (private plus public) capital formation. Finally,
in Section (3e) we consider cyclical variations in the deficit without
(necessarily) viewing departures of actual from trend output as due to
Keynesian fluctuations in effective demand.
The conclusion is that the deficit measure that should be the focus of
concern is the inflation-and-real-growth—corrected, cyclically adjusted
government current account deficit.I have shown elsewhere that this
measure can differ quite strikingly from the conventionally measured
government deficit (Buiter (1981, 1982c)).-4-
2.DEFICITS, INFLATION AND CROWDING OUT IN CLOSED ECONOMIES
WITHOUT GOVERNMENT BONDS
(2a) Models with neither government bonds nor private capital
Consider the world's simplest economy. The income velocity of
circulation of money, V, is constant as is the rate of growth n of real
output, Y. G denotes public spending onoods and services and T taxes net
of transfers. The price level, P, is perfectly flexible. Money, M, is the






PM ___ (5) =- n=
V j-
nV(g-T)-n
At each moment, the rate of inflation equals the proportional rate of growth
of the nominal money stock minus the rate of growth of output. We define
g GY1 and T=TY1.The proportional rate of growth of the nominal money
stock can be expressed as the product of the velocity of circulation and
the public sector deficit as a proportion of GNP. With velocity constant,
an increase in the deficit relative to GNP raises inflation. The deficit,




e.g. the zero inflation deficit is given by nV. Note that in the U.K. the
annual velocity of circulation of base money is about 20 while Ml velocity is—5-
about 7 and M3 velocity about 3,5*With a natural rate of growth of 2 to 3
per year, one's estimate of the zero-inflation deficit in a "pre-Ricardian" U.K.
economy therefore ranges between .1 and .9 per cent of GNP.
There is no role for private capital formation in this model, so the
"crowding out" issue is moot.Let C denote private consumption and S private
saving. Then Y =C+Gand S =Y-T-C=.. Withoutput exogenous, public
spending displaces private consumption one for one.Private consumption is
unaffected by changes in taxes.An increase in taxes lowers private saving
(here equal to the private sector financial surplus) and the public sector
financial deficit equally.Real private financial wealth,is constant.
If we make the velocity of circulation endogenous, the relationship
between changes in the deficit and the rate of inflation may appear to become
ambiguous. An increase in g -Tmightbe offset by a decrease in velocity
sufficiently large to result in a net negative effect on inflation.




For any variable x, (s,t) denotes its value expected, at time t, to prevail
at time s.We assume that the past and present are known i.e. x(s,t) =x(s)
for s t.
-
Velocityas a non-decreasing function of the expected rate of inflation does
not,of course,follow inevitably from rational optirnising behaviour.The model
of equations (1), (2'), (3) and (4) can be viewed as the continuous time analogue
of the discrete time overlapping generations model in which money is the only
store of value, population grows at a rate n and per—capita endowments are
constant. The effect of anticipated inflation on the demand for money in such
*Source:Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin.-6-
models is simply the effect on saving of the anticipated real rate of return.
Substitution and income effects pull in opposite directions.
For most plausible expectations mechanisms, the long run (or steady state)







With .= - weobtain
If the initial equilibrium is characterised by a deficit (g-T > 0) then an
increase in the deficit-GNP ratio could lower the long—run rate of inflation
if velocity were sufficiently responsive to the expected rate of inflation:
v' > (g-TY1 or (+n) >1 --agreater than unitary inflation elasticity
of velocity.
This apparent anomaly, however, can be shown to imply indeterminacy in
the behaviour of the system under rational expectations.
We can solve (1) and (2') for -asa function of in Thisyields
m is a non-predetermined state variable: p can move discontinuously in response
to current and anticipated future shocks. Since in= 9—T—(-- ÷n) in, the
forward-looking rational expectations solution for m in the neighbourhood of a













c0 is the constant of integration.For there to be a unique convergent
forward-looking solution we require x> 0and c0 =0. Since+n=(g—t)V,
the condition x> 0is equivalent to v'(g—T) <1. From equation (7) we see
that this rules out a negative effect of an increase in the deficit-GNP ratio
on the long-run rate of inflation.
The change in. the real value of the government's nominal liabilities (only
money is this model) is not a useful indicator of the behaviour of the rate of
inflation, in the short-run or in the long-run.The stationary equilibria of
both the constant velocity and variable velocity models have a constant stock
of real money balances per unit of output m; real money balances grow at the
natural rate n. In the constant velocity model m is the same regardless of
the rate of inflation.
In the variable vefocity model we know from equation (8) that whenever
expectations of the future are not being revised(i.e. except for those instants
at which 'news' arrives),m(t) and are inversely correlated.Setting C0






(11) =- A - n+
m(t)Jet [9(u,t) -T(ut)]
du
The last term on the right-hand—side of (10) and (11) contains the effect of
revisions, at time t, in expectations about the future course of the deficit.
At those instants that news arrives, P may jump discontinuously. obviously
"jumps" in the opposite direction.On the adjustment path, when no news
arrives the rate of inflation is given by -= - (A÷n)while the rate of change-8-
ofreal money balances per unit of output is an increasing function of the
deficit-GNP ratio.
As suggested in the introduction, the "inflation correction" to be
applied to the deficit in order to evaluate its long-run implications for
money growth consists in subtracting from the flow-of-funds measure the
inflation—induced reduction in the real value of the government's interest-
bearing debt only. The 'nflation ta>? on t1e stock of high-powered money
should not be subtracted.
(2b) Models without government bonds but with private capital
A money-capital model without intrinsically valuable money
A negative long-run effect on the rate of inflation in response to an increase in
the deficit occurs in the simplest money-capital model. denotes the capital
labour ratio, m the stock of real money balances per worker, g real spending
per worker,lump—sum taxes per worker, s the private savings rate (0 <s<1),
and =f(i)(f' >0,f' <0)output per worker.Money is assumed not to yield
any intrinsic, direct utility so it will be held only if its rate ofreturn
equals that obtainable by holding real capital, i.e.
(12) —()
=f'()
The equations of motion forandare given by




In this model an increase in the deficit, whether brought about by raising
or by lowering ',lowers the long-run capital-labour ratio and the rate of
*Thismodel can be viewed as the continuous time representation of an over-
lapping generations model with a Cobb-Douglas production function and
homothetic preferences.Note that if the constraint f' 0 applies, we
can never observe an economy with a positive rate of inflation. Instead
the price of money falls to zero (p tends to infinity) and the model reduces
to the familiar one sector Solow-Swan barter model.Therefore, if money
is held in the steady state, we have <n.- q..
inflationif sf'-n <0and the real per-capita stock of money if sf'-n <0
and f'-n >0.The first of these conditions is the local stability conrlitlon in
the simple Solow-Swan growth model; it also ensures locally stable behaviour
for k in the present model.The second condition rules out dynamic inefficiency






















Across steady states the rate of inflation moves in the same direction as
the capital labour ratio.A lower value of k raises the marginal product of
capital.To preserve portfolio balance the real rate of return on money
balances has to rise pari—passu.This is achieved by a lower rate of inflation.
Note that both spending increases and tax cuts crowd out capital in the long—run,
as does a balanced budget (or constant deficit) increase in spending.-10-
The linearised version of the model in a neighbourhood of the steady state
equilibrium is




mj f ()njLi [1 -l
Thereis one predetermined variable Iandone non-predetermined variable .
Fora unique convergent solution to exist, the equilibrium must be a saddle-
point. The two characteristic roots of the system are A1 =sf—nand A2 =f'-n.
A1 <0and A2 >0are necessary and sufficient for (15) to have a saddlepoint
equilibrium with k predetermined.




(u,t)-1 (l6a) (t) =(s-1)f'






(16b) (t) =e k(t- e [(u)-(ls)(u)] du
I-
The impact effect of an unanticipated permanent increase inthedeficit on the
rateof inflation is analysed in Figure 1.The qualitative features of the
saddlepoint equilibrium are sketched in Figure la with the unique convergent
trajectorygiven by SS. InFigure lb,starting from E1, the increase inthe
deficitis followed immediately by a jump increase in the price level which
lowers real money balances per—capita to
E12.After that the capital—labour
ratio and the rate of inflation decline smoothly along StS' towards
E2.
In
Figure ic there is an immediate jump decline in the price level to followed
again by a gradual decline inandtowards E2. Note that in this model
along the saddlepath SS', the rate of inflation and the stock of realper-
capita money balances are positively related, unlike the variable velocity
model of Section 2a.—11—
FIGURE 1










(c)This money-capital model is the only well-known simnic monetary
model to always have larger deficits associated with lower inflation in the
long-run.The Sidrauski model analysed next exhibits some ambiguity in the
deficit-inflation relation for the general case.A standard restriction,




Consider the rational expectations version of Sidrauski's model of money








-(t) - (t) -(t) - n(t).
0
The economy-wide constraints are:
(17d)w = f() -
(17e)r = f'()
(17f) =f(i) --- n
,\, P
(17g) m =g-T-(- + n)m
(t)0
c is per-capita consumption, real per-capita non-human private wealth,
> 0the subjective discount rate, w the wage rate, r the rate of return on
capital. Public spending neither adds to the economy's productive capacity-.1 3..
nor yields intrinsically valued consumption services.The production function
f(i) is characterised by V >0and f" <0and satisfies the INADA conditions.
The instantaneous utility function u is strictly concave, twicecontinuously
differentiable and increasing in c and m.We also assume that urn u =
c
urn u (c,m) =
m-'O
m
The first-order conditions for an interior optimum are given by the
constraints (17b),(17c) and, after substituting from (17d) and (17e), the
marginal conditions (18a), (18b) and (18c).
(18a) u((t), (t)) -uc('(t)(t))[ + f'((t))J
= 0
(18b) cc(t)t))t)cm(t),t))t) =0
(18c) urn u((t), (t))et =0
t-+
To determine the long-run effect on the rate of inflation of an increase in
the (real per-capita) government deficit we differentiate the steady-state
conditions (19a) —(19d)with respect toor
(19a) f'(k) =n+






The steady—state capital-labour ratio is determined by equation (19a) and
is independent of either the level of public spending or of the level of taxes.
Per-capitaprivate consumption is independent of the level of taxes but decreases
one-for—one when public spending increases.The Sidrauski model has the usual
property that, across steadystates, an x percentage point increase in the rate
ofgrowth of the nominal money stock will be associated with an x percentage
pointhigher rate of inflation. A larger deficit, however, does not necessarily
entail a higher (steady state) proportional rate of growth of money, even in the
very classical Sidrauski model.
The effects of higher spending and lower taxes on long-run inflation are
given in equations (20a) —(20b).
(20a)








mLUcm(f n + s)
_Ummj_u(..÷ n)
*Iftaxes were non—lump sum e.g. a tax on capital income at a proportional
rate e,(18a),(18b), (17e) and (17g) would become
(i8a') umuc(+(le)f') =0
(18b') u((l—e)f'_n_i5) + UccC + Ucm m =0
(17e') r =(l-e)f'(i)
I I P (l7g)m=g-of (k)k-(÷n)m
In the long-run (l—e)f'() =n+ S. Anincrease in enowlowers steady state i.dm
d(-T)
LR
The signs of all these steady-state multipliers are indeterminate.Even the
imposition of the stability or convergence conditions for the unrestricted system,




u(c,m) ______ cm - g-t—
—f(k) + n m






















) U mlu (—÷n-- -
cmp mm] -uc+n)




The assumption that the instantaneous utility function is separable (Ucm =0)
simplifies the algebra and helps resolve the ambiguities
u+ (-÷n+)u (-+ n)
















The state-space representation of the model when =0given in equations








Asa further simplifying assumption we shall assume that the partial
coefficientof absolute risk aversion - =is a positive constant, i.e.
(26)becomes
(26') p(f"(k) -n-) p > 0
Without this assumption the analysis that follows (and Figure 2) are valid
only in the neighbourhood ofa stationary equilibrium.Equations (26') and











the solutions forand ,equation(28) determines the behaviour of
The dynamics of 'andiareillustrated in Figure 2.The =0locus
is vertical at definedby f('*) =n+ 5.The =0locus is strictly
concave, slopes upward for i< reachesa maximum at =** andslopes
. downwardfor k >k**where k** is defined by f'(k**) =n.Since 5 >0and
o k> Thestationary equilibrium at E is a saddlepoint. is
a predetermined variable, 'anon-predetermined variable.The unique
convergent saddlepath is SS.Starting from an initial equilibrium at E, a
cut in taxes, ,(whetheranticipated or unanticipated), will have no effect,
short-run or long-run, onand .
Anunanticipated increase in public spending by an amount dg will immediately
depress consumption by the same amount as the increase in public spending. The
=0locus shifts down vertically by an amount equal to dg. The system remains
at E' afterwards. An anticipated (at t =t0)increase in public spending (at
t =
t1> t) leads to a smaller immediate drop in consumption, to E1, say.
The jump in consumption at t0 places the system on the divergent trajectory
(drawn with reference to E, that will put they system on the unique convergent
trajectory through E' at t1, the moment the increase in public spending actually
takes place. In Figure 2 that point is E2.The path of consumption therefore
only has a discontinuity at t =to,
the moment that "news" arrives.Anticipated
future jumps in private consumption are never optimal.Note that after the
initial downward jump in c, at t =t0,consumption continues to decline gradually
along E1 — — E'.Capitalis first accumulated (along E1 —E2)and then
decumulated (along E2 —E').
The characteristic equation of the system (26'), (27) and (28) linearised
around a stationary equilibrium is-19-
(29) - - f' +n +
U
+ AA2 - A(f'-n) + =
Thecharacteristic roots of the ''—subsystem are found by factoring
A2 - x(f'-n)+ pf"= 0.Itis clear that the subsystemhas one stable
andone unstable characteristic root.This describes the saddlepoint
equilibrium in a neighbourhood of E.The three characteristic roots are




Thereal stock of money balances is a non-predetermined variable.The
existence of a unique convergent solution trajectory therefore requires that
A3 be positive.We now investigate whether A3 > 0is sufficient to ensure
d(.) d(.)
that and are positive.
dg
The condition that A3 be positive is equivalent to the condition that the
denominator of (24a), (24b) and (25a), (25b) be negative. Given this it is
clear from (24b) that, with separability, a larger real per-capita deficit due
to lower taxes will be associated with a higher rate of inflation and (from(25b))
a lower real per—capita stock of money balances.-20-
The effect on long-run inflation of larger deficits due to increased
public spending is not quite unambiguous even withUcm =0.A sufficient
condition for higher inflation to result from higher spending is, from (24a)
that the initial rate of inflation is non-negative.
The behaviour ofafter an unanticipated permanent shock is given by
(t) -= l3f" + (Uum)2 Ucc x2)((t)-)
and karethe new steady values of Iandirespectively.Sincedoesn't
change after an unanticipated change in ''or jumps immediately to its new
equilibrium value. From (25a) and (25b) we know that a larger value ofand
a lower value ofare associated with a lower long-run value of ,i.e.with
a higher velocity. The impact effect on the price level is therefore an
immediate jump up. The rate of inflation also immediately assumes its new
equilibrium value. Since =(-) — n,the rate of inflation will be
higher both because g —Tis larger and because m is smaller.-21 -
3. DEFICITS, INFLATION ANDCROWDINGOUT IN
CLOSED ECONOMIES WITH GOVERNMENT BONDS
(3a) The model of Sargent and Wallace
A convenient starting point for the analysis of therelationship between
deficits, competition for real resource flows between the private andpublic
sectors and monetary growth is the model of Sargent and Wallace (l981),*of
which the Continuous time analogue is given in equations 31—40.All interest—
bearing government debt, B, has a fixed nominal market value and a variable
nominal interest rate, i. L denotes the size of population and labourforce,
n its growth rate














- P(t) (38b) r >-
p(t)
(39) M(t)/M(t) =e 0t <E
B(t) -B(t) —
P(t)L(t)-22-
Output, employment and the real value of the stock of bonds plus the capital
stockgrow at the same proportional rate, n.The real interest rate is fixed.
The model exhibits one-for-one crowding out of private capital formation by
changes in the real stock of government bonds, at a given real interest rate.
The demand for real per-capita money balances is a non-increasing function of
the expected rate of inflation. (38a, b)
pre
technical but not entirely
innocuous assumptions.The model has some peculiar features.One class of
agents (the poor) hold only money as a store of value.A second class of
agents (the rich) hold the bonds and real capital .Aslong as (38b) holds
they will not hold any money.This accounts for the absence of real money
balances in (37) and the dependence of money demand on the rate of inflation
rather than the nominal interest rate.Bonds and real capital are perfect
substitutes in the portfolios of (rich) private agents.
Equations (39) and (40) describe the financial rule followed by the
government, i.e. its money vs. bonds financing mix for a given path of
D(t)G(t) —T(t). The rate of growth of the money stock is e up to t =t.
The amount of bond—financing for t <t istherefore residually determined by the
budgetconstraint., 0(t) and the monetary growth rate.After t =tthe authorities
following a bond financing rule that keeps thereal per—capita stock of bonds
constantat the level achieved at t, i.e. -
(41) B(t) =(. + n)B() fort >[.
Fromtimeonwards, growth of the money stock is therefore residually determined
by the budget constraint, 0(t) and the bond—financing rule (41).
Assuming rational expectations, equations (31), (34) and (41) imply for t
M(t) -G(t)-T(t)- B()or






Considerfirst the case where the demand for money is independent of the
expeted rate of inflation, i.e.2 =0. In that case
(43) =__ - n
1[G(t)T(t) +( n)
-n t
Notethat the deficit measure relevant for monetary growth and thus for inflation





The conventionally defined real per-capita deficit is
**n — ___________ ________ —
L(t)
P(E)L(E)
The intuition behind (44) is clear.Government spending has to be financed
either by explicit taxes, by borrowing or by printing money.To the extent that
borrowing increases the real stock of per-capita government bonds held by private
agents,it increases the future real per—capita deficit (if the real interest rate
exceeds the natural rate of growth).If there is a finite upper bound on the
stock of real per—capita bonds that the private sector will hold, (or the public
sector is willing to owe)then once that upper bound is reached, further deficits
have to be financed by money creation.The point to note is that only nominal
bond issues in excess of the rate of inflation plus the natural rate of growth
times the outstanding stock of bonds (B -(.- + n)B)will raise the real per-capita
stock of bonds. In the flow-of-funds accounts, of which the government budget
constraint is part, debt service is recorded (in real terms) as .Inflation—24—
erodes the real value of the outstanding stock of bonds
by -- andpopulation
growth means that ceteris paribus bond demandgrows by n -. Bondissues less
than (-- n)Bare associated with a falling stock of real per-capita government
interest—bearing debt, lower future conventionally measured deficits ifr >n
and, ceterisparibuslower future money creation.
Note also that B <(- + n)Bmeans that/there is per-capita "crowding in"
in the Sargent—Wallace model.From equation (29) it can be seen that real
bonds (changes in the real stock of bonds) "crowd out" real capital (real
capital formation) on a one-for-one basis.The total rate of accumulation of
capital—cum-real bonds is exogenously given and grows at the natural rate n.
Crowding out takes place not through changes in the real interest rate, which
is constant by assumption, but by channelling private savings into public debt
rather than private capital at a given real interest rate.
Deficits are a source of concern to policy makers because (a) to the
extent that they are not monetised they are feared to cause crowding out and
(b) to the extent they are monetised they are feared to cause inflation.To
investigate whether deficits cause crowding out we consider the behaviour of
the real stock of government interest-bearing debt (or the real per-capita
stock of government interest-bearing debt) for a given path of exhaustive
spending G(t) and taxes net of transfers T(t) and for a given path of monetary
growth.This corresponds to the behaviour of the Sargent-Wallace model for
t <f. Todetermine what the monetary growth rate implied by the fiscal
stance is, we look at the behaviour of monetary growth for given paths of G(t)
and T(t) and for a given value of the real stock of government debt or the real
stock of government debt per-capita. This corresponds to the behaviour of the
Sargent-Wallace model for t t.
In the Sargent—Wallace model changes in --crowdout private capital one—
for-one. This extreme form of crowding out will not hold in many more plausible-25-
models. It seems safe to say, however, that inany model not exhibiting
non-Ricardian debt neutrality, the change in the real(or real per—capita)
stock of public sector interest-bearing debtwill be the proximate determinant
and the best single indicator of thechange in the degree of aggregate or per
capita crowding out pressure that thegovernment is bringing to bear on the
economy.The proposed crowding out measuresare given in (45a, b)
(45a) =G(t)-T(t)+ - e(t) (aggregate crowding out)
t45b'






Equation (45b) represents the behaviour of the realper—capita stock of bonds
for t<t in the Sargent-Wallace model if e(t) =o.
The eventual monetisation implied by the deficit isgiven by (46a) or (46b)



















Equation (46a) determines monetary growth on the assumption of nochange in
aggregate crowding out while (46b) assumes no change in per-capita crowding
out. Equation (46b) represents monetary growth in the Sargent-Wallace model
for t t.V again denotes the income velocity of circulation ofmoney V
If output or income Y grows at the same rateas population; if, as in the
1 Sargent—Wallace model, Y= Lby choice of units and if Y)= 0,then V =—.Ii
The degree of aggregate or per-capita crowding outdepends on the amount of money-25-
financing that is permitted.A useful benchmark is e.g. a monetary growth
rate consistent (in the long run) with zero inflation:0 =n. Given any rule
for monetary growth, the aggregate and per-capita crowding out implied by the
fiscal stance can be found from (45a) and (45b).The per capita crowding out
equation (45b) is the proper one for the evaluation of the very long run or
steady state implications of the fiscal sta,pce for crowding out since in the
steady state must be constant. In (45b), the conventionally measured deficit
is corrected not only for the effects of inflation and real growth on the
outstanding real per—capita stock of bonds (and on the demand for bonds
by private agents) but also for any monetisation permitted by the authorities.
It is obvious that in any given period in which the conventionally measured
deficit is large because of a high current rate of inflation and high nominal
interest rates, the inflation-and—growth-corrected deficit may well be
significantly smaller: the deficit is a monetary phenomenon; its elimination
requires a monetary, not a fiscal ,correction.
Similar conclusions can be drawn as regards the implications of the fiscal
stance and the conventionally measured deficit for monetary growth in the long
run. Equations (46a) and (46b) show what the spending and tax programmes imply
for monetary growth if bond financing is conducted in such a way as to neither
raise nor reduce the crowding out pressure (aggregate or per-capita) exercised
by the government.
The real (per-capita) stock of bonds that the authorities (39) aim to keep
constant need not be the historically inherited one. It could be a target
stock to be achieved at some future date.The deficit measure relevant for
eventual monetisation is the conventionally measured deficit corrected for the
effect of inflation on the real value of the outstanding stock of bonds and
(in the case of (46b)) for the effect of real growth.Current high inflation
may make the current deficit (and the current deficit-GNP ratio) high because-27—
of its effect on nominal interest rates.If the inflation—corrected deficit
is nevertheless negative, this means that, if the authorities were to stick to
their spending and taxation programmes (as a proportion of GNP) and if they
were to keep the degree of aggregate crowding out (--)constant,they would
henceforth have a negative rate of monetary growth and therefore, in duecourse,
a negative rate of inflation.In other words, an inflation-and-growth-
corrected budget surplus means that, whatever the current conventionally
measured deficit may be (i.e. regardless of the current inflation premium in
nominal interest rates), a negative rate of monetary growth would result if
the government simply froze its spending and taxationprogramme as a proportion
of GNP and used bond-financing to keep the bond-(trend)GNP ratio constant.
(3b) Does tighter money now mean higher inflation in the future?
Sargent and Wallace obtained the prima facie paradoxical result that tighter
money early on (a lower value of Sfort <) mayimply a higher rate of growth
of money (and a higher rate of inflation) later on (for t).Specifically,
when =0,a lower value of e(andthus a lower rate of inflation) for t <
alwaysimplies a higher rate of growth of money (and thus a higher rate of inflation)
for t €.BelowI argue that when >0a lower value of 0fort <tneed not
necessarily imply a higher rate of growth of the money supply for t .When
itdoeshowever, itispossible that a lower value of 0fort< t impliesa
higherrate of inflation not only for t E but also for t < t.Current
inflation, when2 0, depends on the entire anticipated future path of the
money supply.The higher later rates of money growth may, for certain parameter
configurations,dominate the lower earlier rates of growth of money as regards
their effect on the price level and the rate of inflation for t <t.
Consider first the case where =0. From (43),_the rate of inflation







It is also easily checked that B(t)will be higher, the lower e, the
Pft)L(t)
proportional rate of growth of the money stock, for t <T. For t <
=- n=6-nand =- .Thebudget constraint can therefore be
written as:





dB G-T — B —



















Equations (47) and (49) together imply that tighter money now (which with
=0means lower inflation now) means looser money and higher inflation later,
if there are no changes in the spending, tax and transferprogrammes.-29-
When we consider the more general case in which the demand formoney is
a decreasing function of the expected rate of inflation >0in equation
(33)) the analysis becomes quite a bit more involved.It is still the case
that










(50) P(t) =— e ii5,t.jds
L(s,t)
If t(t) o(t) is constant for all t ,thereexists a steady state
solution from fonwardswith =____ -
Thereforefor tt
(51)
P= 1 + ( - n))_- n
-p P(t)L(t)
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For this to make sense the roots should of course be real.In addition
we also assume that the authorities will always choose the lower of the two





From (52') it follows that the inflation rate fort Eisagain an increasing
function of since
_______ — (53) =( - n)[(11-.n12)2- ( - n) - >0
It no longer follows necessarily, however, thata lower value of 6 for t <t
Bft) B(t)
b(t). For simplicity implies a higher value of . Let
P(t)L()
we assume in what follows that bonds are index-linked.Jumps in p will
therefore not affect b.
Since










Sfort <, thisbecomes M(s)
























The cause of the ambiguity of the effect from a change in 0 on b(t) is clear
from (54). Given --,alower value of e raises b. is endogenous, however;
with P non-predetermined, can even jump discontinuously.From the monetary
equilibrium condition (33) we see that and P(t) are positively related. If
a reduction in 6 were to lower -initially(the non-Sargent-Wallace case) real
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Therefore, noting from (52') that 71isan (increasing) function of b(E), we have:














Equations (57) and (58) can be solved jointly for
equation forb(t)is rather unpenetrable.
The resulting implicit
condition forb(t)0 is a sufficiently high positive value of 8.
It is clear from (57) that a necessar'
With 0 0,-32-







ds <0:raising the proportional rate of growth of
the nominal money stock lowers the real discounted present value of the
government's new money creation.To see what this implies, consider a
different policy regime in which the same rate of growth of the money stock,
0,ismaintained forever. The convergent rational expectations solution then
has =e-nfor all t after any unanticipated permanent shock.
Inthiscase -[e] [o(i.r2)J =
(Ii
1112fl2y 0<0 if 0 >j__!_+fl
(12
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a convergent
rational expectations solution and a positive steady state stock of real per-.
capita money balances in this policy regime is e —n—— < 0. Thus, provided
1(11 . .. .-. — I—+ni<0<— + ninflation tax receipts decline when the infiation
('12 ( 2
rateincreases. Clearly, no optimising government would push the inflation
rate to the point where the demand for real money balances has greater than unit
elasticity, but this outcome is possible under ad—hoc monetary rules.
If the government lowers the rate of growth of the nominal money stock
1 l
permanently from an initial value greater than +n),the real value of
its money issue will be higher at each point in time than it would have been
at the corresponding moment under the higher rate of growth of nominal money.
Therefore, if the money growth rate is lowered for a sufficiently long period
— ii oftime (0,t), from an initial position for which o >--(— + n),the discounted
t(-n)(t-s)
M() value of its real money issues Je
P(s)
ds is also likely to be higherunder the lower rate of nominal money growth.
Without pretending that the foregoingargument constitutes a formal proof,
I would venture the conjecture that in the variablevelocity version of the
Sargent—Wallace model, we can have at)
Consider now what happens to the rate of inflation for 0t <when the










Since —ispositive,a positive effect of 0onb() is sufficient to
P(t)
>0for 0t <E.Thiswould be the extreme non-Sargent-Wallace
a lower rate of monetary growth lowers the rate of inflationinitially
t <) and,by inducing a lower value of b(E), lowers inflation in the
(for tt) as well.
we have































The Sargent-Wallace paradox which has a lower rate of monetary growth
leading to higher inflation requiresb(t)<0.This is necessary and sufficient
to raise inflation for t t. From (58)b(t)<0is necessary (but not
sufficient) to giveP(t)<0for 0t <P()
<0is necessary and
P(o)
sufficientfor 0) <0,but 0t) <o, 0<t<,isnecessary but not sufficient
P(t forp(t<0,0 <t<E.The Sargent-Wallace paradox that tighter money now
may imply higher inflation now and in the future has its counterpart in the
possibility that tighter money now many imply lower inflation now and in the
future.
A simple graphical representation of some of the rather messy algebra can be
provided.Note that
d M)_M P 1M_M iM lIM2 f
-i
fljW Tf PL
In the Sargent-Wallace example =0for t <Eand =+ nfor t
where risgiven by (52s).For simplicity and without significant loss of
generality, our reference point will be a system in which 0, b(0) and f have been
chosen such that the proportional rate of growth of the money supply is constant
throughout, i.e. e == 00say. The rate of change of real per-capita money
balances is therefore given by.
d M)_ 'l M1 IM
(60)
Equation (60) is graphed as AA in the top panel of Figure 3.-[i-] = 0




.Forthere to exist a non-trivial
stationary equilibrium with >0we therefore require 00 -— - n<0.The
non-trivial stationary equilibrium is at E0.AA reaches a minimum at-35-
-- {o - -- - halfway0 and E0. The bottom panel of Figure 3 graphs
the relationship —= — —
F'2 2 PL
An unanticipated permanent reduction in the rate of monetary growth to
01 <00raises the long-run real per-capita stock of money balances to E1say,
and shifts the AA locus to A'A'.The price level falls immediately as the
economy moves instantaneously from E0 to E1 and stays there.The rate of
inflation falls immediately from 00 -nto 81 -n.A previously unanticipated
future permanent increase in the rate of monetary growth to 02 >
00at t =
resultsin an immediate increase in the price level (at t =0)which places the
system in Figure 4 somewhere on AA between E0 and E02, say at E01. From there
it moves gradually along AA towards E02, where it arrives at t =twhen the
rate of monetary growth is actually increased.At t =tthe system jumps from
E02 to E2.Neither P nor jump at t =E.Att =0the rate of inflation
jumps up to (•).Afterthat it continues to increase gradually to 02 —
01
E01 will be closer to E02 the closer the implementation date (t) is to the
announcement date (0)
The Sargent-Wallace paradox can be represented as a previously unanticipated
immediate temporary reduction in (for 0t<t)followed by
future permanent increase in at t =E beyondits original value.This is
depicted in Figure : Upto t.= 0, the system is at E0 with the rate of
inflation given by (--).Att =0the system jumps onto A'A' to a position
0
such as or E01 '. Fromt =0to t =t thesystem moves smoothly along A'A'
to E02 where it arrives when t =t.At t =tthe system moves to E2.
It is clear that it is possible for the rate of inflation at t0 to rise
in spite of the temporary reduction in monetary growth.If the system were to
move to E01 ',therate of inflation at t =0jumps to (-)> (-) :the rate
01 0

























































 Since at the price level is also above its value at E0, the price level
path is also higher throughout.it is also clear that even if the temporary
reduction in money growth is followed by a rate of monetary growth that is
higher than the initial rate, the impact effect on the price level and the
rate of inflation may well be negative.A move to E01 at t =0would generate
this outcome.
In the extreme non-Sargent-Wallacecase, an initial reduction in money
growth (oi <eo)is followed, after t =t bya rate of monetary growth that also
lies below o, though not necessarily belowo. The case where >
02
>
isdepicted in Figure 6. Here the systems jump at t =0to E01 on the (divergent)
solution path corresponding to
01. It then moves smoothly between t =0and
t =along OA' towards E02. At t =it jumps from E02 to E2.Both the
price level and the rate of inflation decline at t =0and both stay throughout
below what they would have been in the absence of thepolicy change.
In the remaining sections of thepaper we return to the constant velocity
case with 2 =
(3c)An endogenous real interest rate
The analysis is not affected significantly ifwe endogenise the real
interest rate by postulating an inverse relationship betweenthe real interest
rate and the capital-labour ratio, i.e. (35) becomes
(I -IK(tfl / - r
L(t
r<
From(37) we know that once is held constant,will also be constant.





























With =0,the rate of inflation for tt is given by
____ + r1 -8(t)
]
-n 8(t) 1-n t
P(t
y1L P(E)L(t)
Theeffect of a larger stock of real public debt per-capita on the rate of
inflation for tt is given by




Thus a higher value of b(t) raises inflation for t by more when r is endogenous
than when r is exogenous.To determine what happens to b(t) when e is lowered
we specialise (35") to the linear function
(35")r=n+qb 4>00bi
Fort <f, the rate of change of b is governed by
b(t) = o(t)- + (r-n)b
or
(61) (t) = o(t)-+ b(t)2
We shall consider the case where o(t) =ó. The graph of equation (61)
is shown in Figure 7. If the non—monetised part of the deficit, 6 —
/0yi_6
is negative, there are two stationary equilibria,I ,shownas b1 and
b2 in Figure 7a. We believe it to be more in the spirit of the Sargent and
Wallace exercise to consider the case where 6 — ispositive shown in
Figure 7a.In this case the solution of (61) is given by-42-
FIGURE 7






(62) b(t) =tan(t / (o-e'y1J C)/
















Weonly consider solutions in the range 0b(t)T.Sincetan is a periodic
function with tan (rk) 0,k =0,1, 2, .. . ,tan'(x)>0andlirn tan(x) =
IT
x-*—+ kIT
we note that when the interest rate rises linearly with b, the growth of b is so
strong that it tends to infinity in finite time.With tan(z)0 by assumption,
ob(t)will be negative provided the initial stock of bonds, b(O) is not too
large. In this sense, the conclusion of Sargent and Wallace that a lower rate
of growth of money for 0t <t raisesb(t) (and raises inflation for tT)
remainsvalid in the constant velocity model when the real interest rate is
endogenised in the manner suggested above.
(3d) Public Sector Capital Formation
If public sector expenditure on goods and services is not merely of the
hole-in-the-ground public consumption variety, the monetary implications of
the deficit can only be accurately assessed by making a correction for net
public sector capital formation. Let denote public sector consumption,
public sector capital formation, K6 the public sector capital stock,-44-
the private sector capital stock and rG the real rate of return on public
sector capital.We only consider the case where bothrG and the rate of
return on private capital, r, are exogenous. Government bonds still yield
the same expected real rate of return as can be earned from the ownership of
capital . Weassume that the government appropriate the return on its capital
stoc'k, rGKG.
The budget constraint is now /
(66).M+BGCGIiBGG
Extending the Sargent-Wallace policy rules we now assume that for t
both and are kept constant, i.e. =(n+•-) j- and =nKG.
The rate of inflation in t is now given by







If the rate of return from government capital formation rG, equals the
marginal cost of borrowing r, the measure of the deficit relevant for inflation
is the "inflationandgrowthcorrected", government current account or
consumption account deficit.Net capital formation by the public sector in
the long-run creates income equal, in present value, to the cost of borrowing
incurred to finance such expenditure.There are no long-run inflationary
implications of such expenditures.Obvious adjustments have to be made if the
rate of return on public capital exceeds or falls short of the cost of borrowing
GC IT BGKG The use even of the inflation-and-growth corrected deficit+G -
-f (r-n)r
to infer the long-run inflationary implications of the fiscal stance amounts to
assuming, implicitly, that rG= 0 for new public sector investment i.e. that
additional public sector capital formation is entirely unproductive.
Even if we maintain the strong Sargent-Wallace assumption of one-for-one
*
Wehave again substituted output, Y, for employment, L.-45-
crowding out of private capital formation by public borrowing, total national
(privateplus public) capital formation will of course be invariant under bond-
financed increases in public sector capital formation.
(3e) Cyclical corrections
Acommon feature of the tax-transfer structure in most industrialised
courtries is the dependence of net tax receipts on the current level of
economic activity, Y.A simple linear tax function without an intercept




We continue to treat public expenditure on goods and services as exogenous:
it is assumed to grow at the natural rate of growth, n.Trend output is
denoted by Y(t) =L(t).
If output is subject to cyclical fluctuations around a trend, then G(t)T)(t)
is likely to give a misleading impression of the long-run inflationary
implications and the crowding out consequences of the fiscal stance whenever
output deviates from its trend level.Note that it is not necessary to
identify such cycles in the level of economic activity with "Keynesian"
deviations of actual from full employment output.For present purposes they
might as well represent serially correlated movements in the "natural1' or full
employment level of output.Quite separate issues arise when past, current
and prospective future fiscal and monetary policy actions themselves contribute
to endogenous cyclical movements in the level of economic activity. E.g. the
issues raised by Blinder and Solow (1973), concerning the appropriate
"multiplier" weights to be attached to the various fiscal instruments, are not
germane to the point made here.
Consider again a policy regime which fixes the rate of growth of the
nominal stock of money, e, up to t =, financingany resulting deficit (given
the parameters of the expenditure and tax functions, g =andt1 =, by
V
borrowing.After t =Ethe real per capita stock of government interest-bearing
debt is held constant.Equations (69) and (70) are not model—specific:-46-
(69)









Trend crowding out pressure is measure"d by equation (69) which describes
the evolution of the real per-capita (or per unit of trend output) stock of
government bonds for a given monetary growth rate.The inflationary
implications of the fiscal stance in the long-run are captured by (70) which
describes the "eventual monetisation of the deficit" after the system has
reached some upper bound for
For simplicity I shall only consider the case where the velocity of
circulation V -isconstant.The last two equations then become
(69') B(t) 1= g+(r-n)B(t)
{t1 +Y(t) 0t
LY(t)P(t)J P(t)Y(t) Y(t)




If there are cyclical deviations of output from trend, i.e. ifis cyclical
V/\
(e.g.it1= Acos(wt+) +1),long-run crowding out pressure will be overstated
Y(t)
(understated) by the momentary rate of change of—p—wheneveroutput falls below
VP
(rises above) its trend. Once —p-hasreached its upper bound, the trend rate of
VP
growth of the money stock (and thus the average rate of inflation) will be over-
stated (understated) by the current rate of growth of the money supply whenever
output falls below (rises above) its trend value.To get a proper picture of
long-run crowding out pressure (69') should be evaluated at V =V.The-47-
implicationsof the fiscal stance for inflation in the long-run are similarly
obtained by evaluating (70') at V =V. "Cyclical corrections" are therefore
merely a convenient procedure for estimating the trend or permanent deficit.
If departures from trend output are not of a regular cyclical nature and if
upward and downward deviations from trend do not tend to balance each other
out, the convenient short-hand measure of the permanent deficit obtained by
evaluating the deficit at Y(t) =V(t)will be inappropriate.Explicit
estimates of the future expected paths of the deficit will have to be made
instead.
If we take a Keynesian view of business cycles, and model output as
demand-determined, the endogeneity ofcreates the danger that mistaken
V
inferences concerning the fiscal stance will lead to destabilising "corrective"
fiscal actions. (This requires us to drop the assumption of a constant
velocity, which would deprive fiscal policy (changes in g and t1) of any
short-run impact on effective demand). Clearly if=(g,t1,...) with
V
— > 0,a large conventionally measured deficit which corresponded to
g
a small-inflation-and-growth-corrected, cyclically adjusted governmentcurrent
account deficit as a proportion of GDP, might provide the signal for cuts in
public spending or increases in tax rates that lower the level ofeffective
demand and output. Such measures would be quite unwarranted in the sense
that maintaining the fiscal stance (or even reducing t1 and/or raising g)would
be consistent with a secular decline in—p-(holding0=atthe long-run
PY




There should be a moratorium on simplistic statements about causal links
between conventionally measured public sector financial deficits, crowding out
of capital formation and inflation.—49-
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